Norms-Based Intellectual Property Systems: The Case of French Chefs by Fauchart, Emmanuelle & von Hippel, Eric A.
 1  
 Norms-based intellectual property systems: the case of  French chefs 
Emmanuelle Fauchart* and Eric von Hippel** 
MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper (2006) 4576-06.   
Revised July, 2007 
Final version published in Organization Science (2008) Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 187–201 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 In this paper we propose that “norms-based” intellectual property systems exist today, 
and are an important complement to or substitute for law-based intellectual property systems.  
Norms-based IP systems, as we define them, operate entirely upon the basis of implicit social 
norms that are held in common by members of a given community.  Within that community, 
they offer functionality similar to contemporary law-based IP systems with respect to both the 
nature of rights protected and the effectiveness of protection provided.  
 We document the existence of a norms-based IP system among a sample of accomplished 
French chefs.  These chefs consider recipes they develop to be a very valuable form of 
intellectual property.  At the same time, recipes are not a form of innovation that is effectively 
covered by law-based intellectual property systems.  Via grounded research, we identify three 
strong implicit social norms related to the protection of recipe IP.  Via quantitative research, we 
find that accomplished chefs enforce these norms, and apply them in ways that enhance their 
private economic returns from their recipe-related IP. 
 In our discussion, we compare the attributes of norms-based and law-based IP systems, 
arguing that each has different  advantages and drawbacks.  We also point out that the existence 
of norms-based IP systems means that many “information commons” may prove to be criss-
crossed by norms-based fences, with community access controlled by community IP owners. 
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Norms-based intellectual property systems: the case of  French chefs 
 
1. Introduction and overview 
 When one thinks of intellectual property rights, one tends to think of rights encoded in 
law like the patent grant, copyright, trade secrecy and trademarks.  In these “law-based” 
intellectual property (IP) systems, detailed bodies of legislation and case law spell out the rights 
an owner can claim to specific types of intellectual property, and the procedures by which these 
rights can be claimed.  The law of contracts then specifies how the rights can be licensed, and 
bought or sold. Claimed violations of intellectual property rights and contracts can be 
adjudicated and compensation determined via private legal actions in the courts. 
 In this paper we propose that norms-based intellectual property systems also exist and are 
important in at least some fields.  Norms-based IP systems, as we define them, function within a 
group to provide group members with intellectual property rights based upon social norms only.  
Such systems must provide the basic functions of law-based IP systems, but may provide these 
by different means.  Thus, both types of IP systems must grant innovators valuable monopoly 
rights over their innovations.  Both must also enforce these rights  – but may use different means 
to do so. In the case of law-based systems, for example, possible IP violations are adjudicated by 
courts. Court-mandated sanctions for confirmed violations then may include financial payments 
and prohibitions of further violations.  In the case of norms-based systems, possible IP violations 
are assessed by informal community consensus.  Sanctions for confirmed violations are applied 
by community members, and may include shaming, loss of status within the community, and 
reduced future access to valuable community resources like information. 
 Our research is related to and draws upon work by “laws and norms” scholars who have 
explored the roles of laws relative to norms in several arenas (e.g. Ostrom 1990, Ellickson 1991, 
Rai 1999).  We also build upon work by Merges (1996b, 2004) related to private intellectual 
property systems.  Our major contribution in this paper is to provide an existence proof for 
norms-based IP systems - a first documentation of a present-day IP system based solely upon 
norms.  We do this by exploring how accomplished French chefs today protect the new food 
recipes that they develop.  Accomplished chefs consider their recipes to be a very valuable form 
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of intellectual property.  After all, professional reputations and customer patronage at restaurants 
can be built around successful recipes.  At the same time, recipes are not a form of innovation 
that is effectively covered by law-based intellectual property systems today.  Recipes are rarely 
patentable, and combinations of ingredients cannot be copyrighted.  Legal protections are 
potentially available via trade secrecy laws but, as we will see, chefs very seldom use them. 
 In brief overview, we find that an IP system based upon implicit social norms, and 
offering functionality quite similar to law-based systems, does operate among accomplished 
French chefs. Via grounded research, we identify three strong implicit social norms held by all 
chefs we interviewed.  First, a very strong norm exists that a chef must not copy another chef’s 
recipe innovation exactly.  This norm has a very important role in creating a norms-based analog 
to important functions of law-based IP systems.  It has a functional effect analogous to patenting 
in that the community acknowledges the right of a recipe inventor to exclude others from 
practicing his invention, even if all the information required to do so is publicly available. It also 
has an effect analogous to copyright in its regulation of the right to copy a particular "form of 
material expression" of an idea. A second norm mandates that, if a chef reveals recipe-related 
secret information to a colleague, that chef must not pass the information on to others without 
permission. This norm gives a chef a property right similar to that attainable via a contract under 
trade secrecy law: protected by this norm, a chef can selectively reveal his secret information to 
another without fearing that as a result, the information will become generally known.  A third 
norm is that colleagues must credit developers of significant recipes as the authors of that 
information.  This norm gives an additional property right to a chef.  The chef may choose to 
selectively or publicly reveal information about his innovation without jeopardizing the valuable 
related property right of acknowledged authorship.  
 Via quantitative research, we next show that accomplished chefs are significantly more 
likely to deny requested information to colleagues whom they believe may violate the three 
social norms just described.  This selective denial of information is behavioral evidence that a 
functioning norms-based IP system exists: it shows that three implicit norms that together offer 
functionality similar to that of law-based IP systems, are being enforced within the community 
we studied.  As one accomplished chef said: “If another chef copies a recipe exactly we are very 
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furious; we will not talk to this chef anymore, and we won’t communicate information to him in 
the future.”  We conclude that information not afforded the protection of intellectual property 
law may nonetheless be controlled by an effective intellectual property regime based entirely on 
implicit norms.   
 Our findings open up the likelihood that norms-based and law-based IP systems are both 
functioning in the present-day world.  The potential effects of norms-based IP systems will add a 
new dimension to the current scholarly research and debate on the economics of intellectual 
property systems. At present, much of that debate involves the possibility that extant law-based 
intellectual property systems may be constraining rather than supporting innovative progress 
(e.g., Jaffe and Lerner 2004, Benkler 2006, Bessen and Meurer 2008, Strandburg 2007). 
Modification or elimination of these systems is sometimes proposed, with the implicit 
assumption being that the law-based IP systems under discussion are the only ones at issue. Our 
findings indicate that, in at least some fields, the situation is different.  Modification or 
elimination of law-based IP coverage of a field may simply reveal, or even induce communities 
to newly create, a norms-based IP protection system in that field. 
 As we learn more about norms-based systems, we will learn how each type can most 
usefully be understood and applied.  We will also then be in a position to more deeply explore 
how ‘mixed’ norms and law-based systems can best function and best serve the intended social 
and private purposes of creating, defending and diffusing intellectual property.  
 In section 2, we review related literature.  In section 3 we discuss the methods used in our 
case study.  In section 4 we present our grounded research findings on the recipe hiding, trading 
and revealing choices made by French chefs. In section 5 we present our quantitative findings.  
In section 6 we compare the properties of norms-based intellectual property systems with law-
based ones.  We conclude that norms-based intellectual property systems exist today, can be 
effective, and should be further explored.  In section 7 we offer suggestions for further research. 
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2. Literature review 
 In this section we first briefly review matters that provide a context for our study: the 
nature of social norms; the characteristics of law-based intellectual property systems and their 
lack of intersection with recipe protection.  Then we review related literature on laws and norms 
and on private intellectual property systems.  
 
 Social Norms 
 Social norms are pervasive and powerful structural characteristics of groups that 
summarize and simplify group influence processes. They are enforced by a group upon its 
members and generally are developed only for behaviors which are viewed as important by most 
group members (Hackman 1976).  Social norms can be advantageous for groups (Axelrod 1986).  
Social norms have traditionally been viewed by sociologists as rarely written down or explicitly 
discussed (Feldman 1984, Gibbs 1965).  In such cases, evidence that a norm is in place can be 
seen if any departure of real behavior from the norm is followed by some punishment (Bendor 
and Swistak 2001, Rimal and Real 2003).  Social norms can deal with matters that both do and 
do not have important economic consequences for the group embracing them (Elster 1989).  For 
example, workplace norms such as output restrictions directly address the economic concerns of 
a group.  Thus, a “rate buster” who produces significantly more than the average worker in a 
production group could induce management to lower piece-rate pay for all workers in the group 
– a matter with significant economic implications for those workers.  In contrast, social norms 
regulating such matters as mode of dress, manners at table and so forth may but need not have 
important economic significance for group members. 
 Norms are enforceable when groups control stimuli that are valued (or disvalued) by the 
target person.  The more an individual has a personal need for a social reward controlled by the 
group, the more he or she conforms.  Group members who do not much need or care about the 
social rewards that can be provided by their fellows (e.g., very high status members or very low 
status members not committed to remaining in the group) often conform less than other group 
members. (Hackman 1976, p. 1506).   
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 Bendor and Swistak (2001) use evolutionary game theory to test the conditions under 
which social norms are stable.  The stability of a social norm, they find, is maintained when all 
are treated as supporting the norm unless they actually transgress – the “nice” element of a “nice 
but retaliatory” strategy.  However, all participants must punish one who does transgress and 
also punish those who do not join in punishing him – the “retaliatory” element of the strategy.  In 
other words, if a social norm is violated, the obligation to impose punishment must not be 
restricted to those who were hurt by the initial transgression; the obligation must be extended to 
third parties if the norm is to remain stable.  The “if you are not my friend then you are my foe” 
element of the nice but retaliatory strategy insures that it is in the private interest of third parties 
to participate in punishing transgressions. Although participation may involve a cost to these 
parties, they must participate or face the presumably greater cost of being punished too.  The net 
result - assuming that the transgression is not engaged in by too many simultaneously – is that a 
norm remains stable.  
 
 Law-based intellectual property rights systems 
There are three distinct types of law-based intellectual property rights systems in most 
countries: the patent grant, the copyright, and the right to protect trade secrets.  Each of these 
systems covers different categories of intellectual property and has different characteristics.  In 
this section we briefly review the subject matter coverage and characteristics of each system. We 
also note why each has no or little applicability at present to the subject matter of our case study 
– novel recipes. 
 The most general form of patent is the “utility” patent.  In the United States, utility patents 
may be granted for inventions related to composition of matter and/or a method and/or a use. 
They may not be granted for ideas per se, mathematical formulas, laws of nature, and anything 
repugnant to morals and public policy.  Within subject matters potentially protectable by patent, 
protection will be granted only when the intellectual property claimed meets additional criteria 
of usefulness, novelty, and non-obviousness to those skilled in the relevant art. (The tests for 
whether these criteria have been met are based on judgment. When a low threshold is used, 
patents are easier to get, and vice-versa  (Hall and Harhoff 2004).  Within their sphere and 
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duration of coverage, patent grants give inventors exclusive rights to the invention claimed.  No 
one else may use or make that invention without a license from the patent owner - even if they 
independently develop it.  Unlike novel industrial food recipes for, for example, a high-protein 
tortilla, novel haute cuisine recipes today seldom fulfill the 3 criteria necessary for claiming a 
patent: usefulness, novelty, and non-obviousness. (This may change in the future, if and as haute 
cuisine chefs move towards recipe innovations involving novel science such as sous vide - 
cooking at low temperatures under vacuum - and “molecular gastronomy.”)  
 Copyright is a low-cost and immediate form of legal protection that applies to original 
writings and images ranging from novels to software code to movies. Authors need not apply for 
copyright protection; it is automatic under present-day law and “follows the author’s pen across 
the page.”  Only the specific expression of an idea is protected, not – as in the case of patents - 
the underlying invention or idea itself.  The crucial novel information in a new recipe  – the list 
of ingredients, the proportions used and the processing methods used - cannot at present be 
protected by copyright.  However, original writings and images related to presenting a recipe in a 
cookbook or other medium can be copyrighted. (Buccafusco (2007) argues that copyright may 
indeed be appropriately extended to cover novel dishes, although courts have not yet chosen to 
do this.  It is the dish itself, he argues, rather than the recipe, that can be reasonably seen as a 
creative and potentially copyrightable work of authorship). 
  Trade secrets are applicable to any information not generally known in an industry and of 
demonstrable economic value to a firm possessing the secret.  Trade secret law protects only 
information that can be kept secret by a firm while being commercially exploited.  Employees 
and others can be legally bound by contract to not reveal a firm’s trade secrets.  A possessor of a 
trade secret may take legal steps to prevent its use by others if he can show that those others have 
discovered the secret through unfair and dishonest means such as theft or breach of a contract 
promising to keep it secret.  However, the holder of a trade secret cannot exclude anyone who 
independently discovers that secret or who legally acquires it by such means as accidental 
disclosure or reverse engineering.   
 In practice, trade secrets have proven to be effective only with regard to (1) product 
innovations incorporating various technological barriers to analysis, or (2) with regard to process 
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innovations which can be hidden from public view.  Aspects of recipe ingredients and 
preparation techniques that can be effectively hidden in a restaurant’s kitchen can therefore in 
principle be protected as trade secrets.  For example, a chef may legally require as a condition of 
employment that employees sign a labor contract binding them to not disclose recipe-related 
trade secrets.  However, as we will see in grounded research findings to be presented later, chefs 
in our sample seldom take the steps required to legally defend the status of their recipe-related IP 
as trade secrets.  This is because, as chef interviewees told us, they think that the benefits of 
doing so are unlikely to outweigh the costs. 
 Owners of intellectual property rights under all three of these systems can keep their 
rights entirely to themselves, or license or sell all or aspects of their rights to others.  For 
example, a patent owner can grant another rights to use his patent for any purpose, or only for a 
specific type of application.  Similarly, the holder of  a trade secret can make legally binding 
contracts with others in which all or only aspects of the secret are revealed in exchange for a fee 
or other consideration along with a commitment to not diffuse the secret further. Violations to 
such agreements can be brought to a court of law for adjudication.   
 
 Norms-based intellectual property systems 
 Findings of “laws and norms” studies make it quite plausible that effective IP systems 
based only upon social norms might exist today.  These studies explore the role that norms play 
in a range of fields traditionally assumed by legal scholars to be the exclusive province of law. 
For example, private methods of contract enforcement independent of law have been explored by 
several (e.g., Macaulay 1963, Bernstein 1992, Greif 1993, Zhou and Poppo 2005).  Thus, Greif 
describes how a coalition of Maghribi traders successfully enforced contracts with their agents in 
far-distant lands by privately-established rules.  For example, the community of traders had a 
norm that none would hire an agent who had fallen short of his obligations to any trader. Ostrom 
(1990) and others have documented the quite elaborate community practices that enable 
communities to successfully share resources held in a commons, such as commonly-accessible 
fisheries.  Methods by which neighbors settle disputes without recourse to the law have been 
studied by Ellickson (1991) and others. 
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 Often in these studies, implicit norms are found to play a dominant role.  Thus, Ellickson, 
in exploring how rural neighbors allocated the costs of maintaining the fences that separated 
their properties and herds of cattle, found that essentially none were aware of Section 841, the 
California statute that specifies how boundary-fence costs are to be allocated.  He therefore 
sought to identify “…the norms to which [adjacent rural property owners] were dancing.”  
“Although,” he writes,  “rural residents could quickly resolve simple hypothetical fence-cost 
disputes posed to them, they never articulated general principles of fence-cost allocation.  Their 
statements and practices revealed, however, that they tend to follow a norm of proportionality.  
This norm calls for adjoining landowners to share fencing costs in rough proportion to the 
average density of livestock present on the respective sides of the boundary line” A second norm 
is that ranchers (large land owners) will never ask for a contribution to fencing costs from 
owners of ranchettes (small land owners) even though the law would sanction it (ibid, pp.71-75).  
In other words, Ellickson found that the boundary fence maintenance norms actually followed by 
rural neighbors differed in a number of respects from the law. 
 Ellickson argues that law is often unimportant relative to norms in shaping many types of 
social interactions, saying:  “I didn’t appreciate how unimportant law can be when I embarked 
upon this project.”  His book, he says, “seeks to demonstrate that people frequently resolve their 
disputes in cooperative fashion without paying any attention to the laws that apply to those 
disputes.” (ibid, p. vii).  A study by Walsh et al. (2005) supports Ellickson’s emphasis within the 
arena of intellectual property rights.  These authors studied the IP-related practices of  
biomedical researchers in universities, governmental and nonprofit institutions.  Most, they 
found, simply ignore the legal rights of patent-holders whose claims might impede their 
research.  They found that only 5% even bothered to check to determine whether their work 
might be infringing upon existing patents. “Our research thus suggests that “law on the books” 
need not be the same as “law in action” if the law on the books contravenes a community’s 
norms and interests. … our results suggest that [patent] infringement remains of only slight 
concern [to non-commercial biomedical researchers].”   
 More general studies of IP-related norms in scientific communities have been conducted 
by a number of scholars. These norms generally involve restrictions upon the claiming of IP 
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rights by scientists. Thus, Merton (1973) documented the existence of a “communitarian” norm 
in such communities, mandating the open sharing of the “intellectual property” of scientific 
research results and research methods used to obtain them. Others have explored the detailed 
workings of this norm and how it is limited in some circumstances by implicit or explicit 
assertion of property rights by scientists and their employers (e.g., Dasgupta and David 1984, 
Rai 1999, Merges 1996a)  
 Ellickson and some others argue that norms can sometimes be used in place of law.  But 
Rai (1999) argues that this portrait has been overdrawn by early research on the topic. 
“Subsequent law and norms scholars” she writes, “have argued that law and norms do not 
generally operate in separate spheres.  Rather, they typically operate either to support or subvert 
each other.”  For example, she points out, laws prohibiting smoking in public places can be 
supported by social norms that condemn such behavior – or can be subverted by social norms 
that are supportive of smoking in public. 
 Merges (1996b, 2004), has studied the role of norms in the functioning of “innovation 
institutions.”  He says (2004, p.3) “I see guilds as one example of a larger set of informal 
institutions that facilitate innovation by virtue of shared norms.  Sometimes these norms take the 
form of reciprocity: an understanding that all members of a circle have the right of access to at 
least some common techniques and information…   At other times, they take the form of limited 
exclusivity: recognizing the right of individual members of the circle to exclusive use and 
possession of self-generated information.” 
 “Guilds” he says “may have been the first such institutions, but they were by no means 
the last.”  He then lists a number of additional examples, including “collective invention” (Allen 
1983), patent pools, and standard-setting organizations. He also includes “private intellectual 
property systems” - which he defines (1996b) as systems involving no state-granted intellectual 
property rights.  Examples of these he mentions are 1930’s fashion guilds; “the contemporary 
entertainment industry, which relies heavily on industry-wide norms and informal (non state-
backed) enforcement mechanisms such as arbitration.”  He also includes informal know-how 
trading (von Hippel 1987) because its functioning involves norms of reciprocity.  He also 
includes the open source software movement because it too “…depends in part upon reciprocity 
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and other informal norms, which I would argue makes it a contemporary variant on these 
institutions.”  
 Merges’ examples all do have an intellectual property component in which norms play a 
role.  Several are useful examples of “mixed” law and norms-based systems.  But, for our 
present purposes of establishing an “existence proof” for a pure, norms-based IP system as we 
have defined it, these examples won’t do.  Recall from our definition that we seek to document 
the existence IP systems that are based entirely upon social norms, and that have functionality 
similar to that offered by law-based systems. Thus, open source software, one of Merges’ 
examples, is based upon norms only in part: It also is built upon software authors’ state-granted 
copyrights.  Similarly, the private IP systems of the Fashion Guilds may reflect the norms of the 
community of fashion designers and manufacturers – but enforcement was by contract law based 
upon written agreements.  (Fashion designs, like recipes, are not protected by law-based 
intellectual property rights.  In response, there have been several attempts over the years by 
fashion designers and manufacturers to create private intellectual property systems.  See a 
description of the Fashion Originators' Guild of America, in Merges 1996b, p. 1363). 
 With respect to norms-based IP systems that offer functionality similar to law-based 
systems, Merges examples can best be seen as potential components  of what we are calling 
norms-based IP systems. Thus, informal know-how trading is a mechanism for exchanging 
secret information based upon reciprocity norms. It enables the profitable exchange of trade 
secrets.  However, it does not offer traders control over information that is publicly known – a 
form of control that is offered by patents.  Similarly, collective invention involves only the norm 
that invention-related information will be “freely revealed” so that all – whether inside or outside 
of a given community – can have free access. This too can play a role in a norms-based private 
intellectual property system offering the functionality similar to a law-based one, but is not such 
a system by itself.  (Free revealing occurs when all intellectual property rights to specific 
information are voluntarily given up by an information owner, and all interested parties are given 
access to it—the information becomes a public good.  For example, placement of non-patented 
information in a publicly accessible website or television program would be free revealing under 
this definition (Harhoff et al. 2003)).   
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3.  Case study context and methods 
 Our case study explores the operation of a social norms-based intellectual property 
system among accomplished haute cuisine chefs working in France.  Specifically, we focus on 
norms-based IP related to recipes developed by these chefs.  We have selected this arena for a 
field study because it combines two characteristics useful for our purposes.  First, intellectual 
property in the form of novel recipes has high economic importance to accomplished chefs.  
Second, as we saw in our literature review, extant law-based intellectual property systems are 
today not applicable and/or are little used to protect this form of intellectual property.  As a 
result, we expect that chefs will rely largely upon a norm-based IP system to protect their recipe-
related intellectual property if and as this is feasible for them.  In turn this will – we hope - 
simplify our task of understanding the operation of and effects of an IP system of this type.   
 Our study proceeded in two major phases.  First, we conducted grounded field research to 
identify important social norms dealing with recipe-related intellectual property.  Second, we 
conducted a quantitative, questionnaire-based study to determine whether innovators deployed 
these norms to gain private economic advantage, and to determine whether violators of the 
norms were in fact sanctioned by accomplished haute cuisine chefs.  
 Our samples for both studies consisted of the chefs de cuisine in restaurants that had 
received “stars” and/or “forks” from the Michelin Guide as a sign of their culinary excellence. 
The Michelin Guide is an independent evaluation agency for restaurants.  The award of stars by 
the Guide is a major honor.  Forks are also prestigious, but less so than stars.  (Forks are given to 
“good gastronomic restaurants” that also have a good balance between gastronomic level and 
price of the meal.  Awards can range from 1 to 5 forks.)  In the 2005 Michelin Guide there are 26 
three star, 70 two star, and 405 one star restaurants in France. Michelin stars are given to 
restaurants and not to chefs de cuisine.  However, the award is in the main based upon factors 
related to the performance of the chef de cuisine. Hence, when a chef de cuisine leaves a 
restaurant, the stars are “suspended” until the next examination by the Michelin experts.   
 A major criterion for awarding stars or forks to a restaurant is “renewal” - the ability to 
offer creative and new recipes on a regular basis.  By focusing on the chefs de cuisine who have 
actually created these recipes, we are focusing on chefs who presumably regard innovation as 
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important to their professional and economic success. Typical comments by awardees and others 
support this expectation. Thus Thierry Thiercelin (2005) said after gaining his first star: “Now 
there is no room for error anymore, I must be at 100% of my capabilities and able to answer my 
customers’ expectations for innovative and renewed recipes.” 
 Losing or gaining a star has substantial economic consequences.  Johnson et al. (2005) 
report that "the loss of a star is catastrophic - causing [restaurant] sales to drop as much as 50% 
in some cases".  Chefs who have been responsible for winning stars for restaurants often are in a 
position to profit from increased restaurant sales, and have other types of opportunity to benefit 
financially as well.   There is demand for chefs believed able to help an establishment gain a star: 
in particular, luxury hotels in Paris seek such chefs.  Also, enhanced reputation may enable a 
chef to profit from lines of prepared food bearing his label in food stores, consulting to 
agribusiness firms, consulting to restaurants in foreign countries, participation in TV shows; 
increases in book sales, and so on.  An anonymous gastronomy expert summed up the situation 
nicely for the Nouvel Observateur (2005): “Gaining a Michelin star ensures that your banker will 
be kind to you.”  
 In our grounded research phase we interviewed 10 accomplished chefs who had a place 
of business geographically near to Paris, and so could be conveniently visited by the first author  
of this paper. Requests for a meeting were made to 12 chefs, and 10 responded positively. Seven 
of these were interviewed face-to-face, and 3 were interviewed by email. Seven of the 10 chefs 
interviewed had Michelin stars.  Three had no stars, but were listed in the Michelin guide as 
chefs de cuisine in “good gastronomic restaurants.”  
 In the quantitative phase of our study, we again elected to focus on obtaining information 
from very accomplished chefs. We therefore distributed our questionnaire to chefs given some 
form of recognition in the Michelin Guide.  These included chefs holding stars, “rising stars,” 
and chefs holding from 2 to 5 forks. (Rising stars are chefs listed in the Guide as likely to receive 
their first star within the next year.) Questionnaires were mailed to all sample members at their 
places of business and respondents were asked to return them by mail.  No follow-up was done 
to increase the rate of response: We did not want to annoy the chefs, and decided to take non-
response as a ‘no’. Of 485 questionnaires sent out 104 were returned, a response rate of  21.4%.  
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Ten of these contained essentially no data and so were not included in our analyses.  Our 94 
analyzable questionnaires were reasonably well distributed across the expertise categories in the 
Michelin Guide: 7% came from two star chefs, 62% from one star chefs, 3% from rising stars, 
and 28% from chefs awarded forks. 
 When chefs did fill out our questionnaires at all, they tended to do so quite completely.  
However, some questions solicited responses only under some conditions. (For example, “Please 
only answer the following additional questions about action X if you did do action X.”)  For this 
reason, the sample size given in our tables is significantly less than 94 in the case of some 
analyses.    
 
4. Grounded Research Findings 
 Chefs interviewed in our grounded research phase told us without exception that the 
development of novel haute cuisine recipes is a very important activity for them and similarly 
accomplished chefs. We also learned that these chefs and their colleagues seldom attempted to 
gain legal protection for their recipe IP.  As was noted in our literature review, recipes seldom 
rise to the level of novelty required to qualify for a patent grant, and copyright is not applicable 
to the content of recipes, so it is reasonable that chefs would not attempt to apply these forms of 
protection.  However, aspects of recipes can be kept secret even when a recipe is in use at a 
restaurant – for example, food preparation techniques not visible to diners, and “secret 
ingredients.”  This recipe-related IP can in principle be protected by trade secrecy law.  
Interviewees informed us that accomplished chefs do sometimes send a written notice to those 
hiring a former employee saying that that person is prohibited from revealing trade secrets 
learned from his former employer.  However, we were told, if such a trade secret is revealed by a 
former employee or by some other means, chefs who suspect their legal rights have been 
violated will very rarely seek redress through the courts.  Probably instances of turning to the 
courts do exist, but our interviewees could not recall any such case.  This is generally regarded 
as too difficult and too expensive to be worth attempting. 
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 Intellectual property-related norms 
 When we raised the issue of whether or how rights to recipes could be protected given 
the absence of applicable and effective laws, we were told examples and stories of “proper 
professional behavior” in this regard.  Applicable social norms that appear in these stories have 
not been clearly codified or written down by chefs – they are implicit.  However, three major 
norms consistently emerged in all our interviews. We encode the first norm as follows: It is not 
honorable for chefs to exactly copy recipes developed by other chefs.  Chefs were vehement 
about how very wrong it was to copy the recipe of a colleague.  As was mentioned earlier, one 
interviewee said:  “If another chef copies a recipe exactly we are very furious: we will not talk to 
this chef anymore, and we won’t communicate information to him in the future.”  It is, however, 
acceptable to develop creative variations on recipes developed by others.  How different a new 
recipe should be to avoid the prohibition against exact copying is not precisely specifiable, but 
chefs think they know a too-close copy when they see it.  This anticopy norm seems to us to 
offer intellectual property protection similar to that offered by a patent grant or a copyright.  As 
we will see later, accomplished chefs could duplicate many of the valuable recipes developed by 
colleagues using only public, legally unprotected information – but the norm prevents them from 
doing this. The anticopy norm benefits innovating chefs whose restaurants might well lose sales 
and profits if their novel recipes were copied by others. 
 The second important norm that emerged in our interviews is that a chef who asks for and 
is given proprietary information by a colleague will not pass that information on to others 
without permission.  This norm applies only to information that can be kept as a trade secret if 
not revealed.  The requirement “to not pass it on” is important but is generally not stated when 
information is transferred in response to a request – it is implicit:  As one of our interviewees 
said: “If I give information to another chef I trust him to not pass it on.  I do not have to say 
this.”  This norm gives holders of proprietary information the freedom to selectively reveal 
aspects of what they know.  That is, a chef can choose to reveal information to colleague A and 
at the same time feel confident that A will not tell others. Freedom to selectively and 
conditionally reveal information seems to us to offer functionality similar to legal contracting 
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related to trade secrets: one can contract to reveal a trade secret to A with the stipulation that A 
will not pass that information on to others. 
 Often, as we will see in our quantitative data, chefs selectively reveal secret information 
to colleagues in expectation that they will not pass it on and that the information recipients will 
be more likely to reciprocate by revealing valuable information in return.  When they behave in 
this way they are engaged in “informal information trading.”  The phenomenon has been 
documented by several scholars (von Hippel 1987, Schrader 1991, Kreiner and Schultz 1993, 
Bouty 2000).  Informal information trading has been shown to increase participants profits under 
some conditions.  The basic argument is that revealing a unit of secret information to another 
reduces the monopoly profits that an innovator can obtain from its information – because now a 
rival is also using it.  However, a trade will nonetheless pay whenever that reduction in 
monopoly profits is more than offset by the increase in profits gained by receiving in 
reciprocation a new unit of secret information from the trading partner.  When this is so,  it has 
been shown that information trading fits the conditions for a Prisoner’s Dilemma (von Hippel 
1987).  Given repeated plays, cooperation will be the most profitable long-term strategy for those 
engaged in the practice (Axelrod 1984). 
 A third norm had to do with the right to be acknowledged as the author of a recipe one 
has created.  This norm applies to a recipe that one may observe at a creator’s restaurant or ask 
the developer about, and also when the innovator publicly reveals his innovation by, for 
example, publishing it in a cookbook or a magazine or describing it on TV. This norm offers a 
functionality offered by copyright and also by law on the ‘moral rights’ of authors and artists to 
have the paternity of their work acknowledged (Hansmann and Santilli 1997).   
 A chef that presents the recipe of another as his own is considered not honorable.  As 
illustration, consider an excerpt from a letter of reproach written by a famous chef to a former 
employee who presented one of the chef’s recipes on TV without proper attribution.  The chef 
also distributed his letter to a number of his colleagues, so that the community as a whole would 
learn of his former employee’s violation of an important norm. A copy, written in French, was 
given to us by an interviewee and we translate a portion of it as follows: 
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"Sir: First, I must tell you that seeing on TV a former employee showing things I have 
taught him is a real pleasure. Unfortunately this pleasure was brief, as your presentation 
has revealed a rare ingratitude.  Never did I hear you say what you owe to the master I 
have been for you. You should admit that presenting recipes that are mine and that I 
taught you without referring to my name constitutes an unacceptable indelicacy.  …  I 
hope that in your future presentations you will repair these errors and shall credit me with 
what I have taught to you. Only after this honest acknowledgement will I be happy that 
you receive a share of my notoriety.” 
 
 The norm requiring acknowledgement of authorship enables chefs to profit more than 
free riders even when they reveal their innovations to all. Given known authorship, a chef can 
use free revealing to raise his reputation with the general public and thus, for example, increase 
his profit from selling cookbooks and/or from increased traffic to his restaurant.  Chefs often 
select their more important and interesting recipes to reveal in this public way, reasoning that 
their reputation will be more effectively enhanced by revealing major rather than minor 
innovations. 
 Chefs interviewed clearly thought that adherence to the norms described above was very 
important.  Thus: “[If someone were to violate an important norm], …my esteem for the guy 
becomes very low. I think the chef has no self-esteem, and does not respect the code of honor.” 
Transgressions of the three norms we identified – and presumably of any additional norms that 
may also exist in this community – are, we were told, punished by negative gossip within the 
community, by a related lowering of a violator’s reputation, and by a decreased likelihood that 
additional requests for information will be answered by community members. Famous chefs do 
not necessarily need to take personal action to insure transgressions are noticed and 
appropriately punished by their community.  As one interviewee said: “The community knows 
my style and can recognize when someone is copying me. Therefore I do not need to intervene in 
any way.”   
 Note that our interviews did not necessarily evoke a complete set of IP-related norms.  
We could have entirely  missed an important norm simply because our questions did not happen 
to trigger stories related to it from our interviewees.  (By way of analogy, we could learn about 
the norm ‘thou shalt not kill’ from interviewees without necessarily triggering any discussion of 
the norm ‘thou shalt not steal’.)  Fortunately, completeness is not necessary to our present 
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purpose.  We simply want to understand whether some social norms exist that can serve to at 
least partially protect the IP of recipe developers. 
 Note also that Chefs’ IP-related strategies are complex, and further work will be required 
to map and understand them fully.  As illustration, an interviewee told us that chefs who publicly 
reveal a recipe may not necessarily reveal all the information required to exactly reproduce it.  
“Usually, a chef does not disclose everything when publishing a recipe in a cookbook.  The 
published version may exclude important “tricks” (elements of technique), and may even omit 
some ingredients.” Interviewees also say that some cookbooks they write are intended for an 
audience of peers primarily rather than for home cooks.  One important function of these 
professional books is to convey information about priority. If an imitator publishes a recipe that a 
famous chef developed, that chef may later publish the same recipe in a professional cookbook 
of his own.  In this way he signals to colleagues that he believes that he, rather than the first to 
publish, has priority.  
 Chefs often use the various intellectual property strategies available to them in sequence 
or as required by events to maximize their private returns.  Thus, they often choose to keep 
exclusivity on new recipes served in their restaurants for a period of time before publishing them 
in a cookbook.  
  
5. Findings from quantitative research 
 In overview, our quantitative research is designed to explore two matters: (1) whether the 
norms that we identified via grounded research are actually being enforced by chefs, and (2) 
whether chefs are enforcing the norms in a way likely to increase their private innovation-related 
profits. Our test of the first matter draws upon patterns of selective information revealing in our 
sample of chefs.  We first determine whether some of our respondents’ recipe-related 
information is secret – and so is potential subject matter to be selectively revealed at the 
discretion of our respondent chefs.  We then test whether chefs selectively deny requested 
information to colleagues they think are likely violators of the three IP-related norms.  If they do 
this, we have evidence that the norms are being enforced.  Our test of the second matter involves 
determining whether patterns in the selective and free revealing of IP can increase chefs’ 
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innovation-related profits – the goal of law-based IP systems.  If both of these elements can be 
seen, we think it is reasonable to conclude that a functioning norms-based IP system exists in the 
field of recipes. 
  
 Are norms being enforced by chefs? 
 Chefs in our quantitative sample judged that novel recipes were very important to their 
professional success.  When asked about the “importance your customers place upon finding 
original recipes (your own creations) on your menu,” the average importance ranking given by 
our respondents was 4.52 out of 5 (std dev : 0.72), where 5 was “very important.”  Chefs also 
reported that a significant fraction of the recipes they develop would be difficult for others to 
reproduce without their help (table 1).  This means that chefs do have recipe-related IP that can 
be kept secret for some period of time unless they choose to reveal it. 
 
Table 1 : Many recipes are difficult to reproduce without help from the innovator 
 
“% of your recipes 
that another chef 
would find it difficult 
to reproduce without 
your help” 
0%  25%  50%  75%  100% Do 
not 
know 
(n) 
% of chefs in total of 
respondent chefs who 
ticked the above 
category 
 
 
10.5% 
 
39.5% 
 
29% 
 
5.2% 
 
0% 
 
15.8
% 
94 
 
 
 IP that can be kept secret by innovators can also be revealed if innovators elect to do this.  
In the case of accomplished chefs, one type of opportunity to make such a decision occurs when 
colleagues working in other restaurants request specific items of recipe-related information.  As 
can be seen in table 2, this type of event happens often.  Ninety percent of the chefs in our 
sample report being asked for such information at least once in the past year, and 28% report 
being asked at least 6 times. 
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Table 2: Most chefs receive recipe-related information requests from colleagues 
 
 Never  1 to 5 
times 
6 to 10 
times 
More 
than 10 
times 
NA (n) 
 
How frequently did you 
receive recipe-related 
information requests from 
colleagues in the past year? 
10.2% 61.4% 14.8% 13.6% 3 94 
 
Recall from our section 4 grounded research discussion that French chef interviewees 
said that norms violations were punished by negative gossip within the community, by a related 
lowering of a violator’s reputation, and by a decreased likelihood that additional requests for 
information will be answered by community members.  Via our questionnaire, therefore, we 
sought to determine whether chefs’ decisions to reveal their information to a specific requester 
was related to expectations that that requester was a likely norms violator. This approach had the 
advantage of linking expectations of norms violations to a type of punishment behaviour that had 
been reported by our interviewees – selective denial of requested information.  
Our research strategy on this matter was to ask each respondent to tell us about two cases 
where he had been asked for recipe-related information.  First, we asked a number of questions 
about the most recent case where a chef had been asked for information and had provided it.  
Second, we asked the same questions about the most recent case where a chef had been asked for 
information and had not provided it.  We then analyzed the chefs’ responses to see if there is an 
association between expected adherence to the three norms we described earlier and willingness 
to provide secret IP.   
As can be seen from table 3 we found that IP holders were significantly more likely to 
deny secret IP to requesters they thought likely to violate each of the three social norms.  We 
also found that this association was strongest when information of high value was being 
requested. Note that the decision to withhold proprietary information from a colleague judged 
likely to not adhere to community IP-related norms may be intended as norms enforcement 
and/or it may be a private attempt to protect IP likely to be at risk if revealed to that person.  
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Either way, the behavior by these individuals serves to enforce community norms: access to 
requested information is selectively being denied by community members to individuals with 
past or anticipated norms violations.   
 
Table 3: Chefs are significantly more likely to give information to chefs they think will 
adhere to IP-related community social norms.   
 
I expect that the person who requested 
recipe-related information from me: 
Relationship between information-holder’s 
expectations that information requester 
will adhere to norms and his decision to 
provide information  
(a)
 
(n) 
1. Will NOT copy my recipe exactly
(c)
 P < 0.0035 61 
2. Will ask my permission before 
passing on the information I gave him 
to another
(b)
 
 
P < 0.063 
 
65 
3. Will credit me as author
(b,d)
 P < 0.014 72 
(a) Marginal homogeneity test, paired samples, one-tailed. 
(b) 5-point Likert scale 
(c) Respondents chose one option from 3 descriptions of increasingly-exact copying behaviors. 
(d) Recall that our qualitative field research identified a norm requiring acknowledgement of authorship for  
recipe-related information that was privately or publicly-revealed.  However, our questionnaire asks 
information providers only about their expectations that a specific information requestor will adhere to that 
norm in the case of proprietary information selectively revealed to him as an individual.  
 
Note also that there is some possibility that this finding reflects post-hoc cognitive 
dissonance reduction on the part of the chefs rather than norm-related choicemaking.  That is, 
when answering our questions, a chef could simply be thinking: “I did refuse to give this person 
information.  I would only have done this if he is a bad person or undeserving in some way – so I 
will respond to the questionnaire accordingly.”  To reduce the risk of this type of artifact, 
nothing in our letter of introduction to chefs or in our questionnaire indicated we were interested 
in studying social norms.  In addition, we scattered our norms-related questions among others, 
did not identify questions as norm-related, and asked the questions in a non value-laden way.  
We simply asked, for example, how likely the chef thought it was that the specific chef who had 
requested information from him would exactly copy the recipe he was asking about.  Finally, we 
should point out that we know nothing about the actual norms-related behaviors of information 
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seekers because we did not obtain information from information recipients – only providers. 
However, this does not affect the validity of our finding.  The decision to provide or withhold IP 
is in the hands of the chef holding that IP, and is related to his or her perceptions of the attributes 
of the information seeker, and not to the actual attributes of that person. 
 
Are patterns of selective revealing likely to increase innovators’ private economic 
returns? 
 As was discussed earlier, social norms do not always have to do with the economic 
advantage of individual group members or the group as a whole.  But intellectual property law is 
designed specifically to enhance innovators’ likely private economic returns from innovation, 
and so to increase their incentives to innovate.  In this section we explore whether norms-related 
patterns in the information revealing and hiding behavior of the chefs in our sample are 
consistent with a goal of increasing innovators’ economic returns from their innovations.  If so, 
we have evidence that a norms-based IP system exists in this community. 
 We first see that chefs who selectively reveal recipe-related information to a colleague 
appear to be engaging in informal information trading rather than altruism.  As table 4 shows,  
 
Table 4: Chefs feel that their decision whether to reveal or refuse to supply information 
requested by a colleague will affect the likelihood of getting information from that 
individual in the future 
 
Expected change in willingness of requester  
to provide information in the future :  
Decrease No change 
(a)
 Increase 
Chef provided requested information  4 42 22 
Chef refused to provide requested information 23 43 2 
Chi-square = 32.472 p =  0.000 
 
(a)
 “No change” was in most cases chosen when chef and requester had shared information equally in the past.  In 
such cases there was already a trading relationship between the partners involving reciprocity.  Under these 
conditions, there would be no reason for an information provider to expect that a particular exchange in a series 
would materially affect a recipient’s willingness to provide information in the future.  
 
they expect their decision to provide or not provide requested information will affect the 
likelihood that the information seeker will reciprocate at a future time. As was discussed in 
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section 4, “informal information trading” can increase profits for participants assuming that there 
is reciprocity, and assuming also that information recipients adhere to the norm of not passing on 
the secret that has been shared with them.  
 We asked chefs about the value of the information that they would be willing to freely 
reveal in two contrasting ways: (1) free revealing “to everyone at once” in a public forum and (2) 
sequential, person-to-person revealing to “any one who asks.”  Chefs were more likely to present 
high value recipe information in a public forum.  In sharp contrast, they were significantly more 
likely to reveal low-value information privately to anyone who asked (table 5).  This makes 
sense to us as an economically reasonable strategy: increased reputation is likely to result from 
publicly revealing a recipe only if something valuable and interesting is revealed.  In contrast, 
private but non-selective revealing of information (“to anyone who asks”) may not yield the 
reciprocity benefits associated with more selective revealing of information. 
 
Table 5: Value of recipe information revealed privately “to anyone who asks” versus 
revealed to all in a public forum 
Decision to: High value 
information
(a)
 
Low value 
information
(a)
 
 
Reveal in a public 
forum  
78% 22% 100% 
Willing to privately 
reveal to “anyone who 
asks” 
26% 74% 100% 
Chi-square 
 
p < 0.000 
 
(a) The value of the information is an index: high value information is information that is related to a recipe that is 
both a “must” of the chef’s menu and that is “unique among direct competitors” (rated 4 or 5 on a scale of 5 for 
both items). 
  
 Finally, we asked chefs why they would reveal some of their recipes to the public at large 
(table 6).  We did not offer chefs a complete list of possible motives in our questionnaire.  
However, it can be seen that respondents did tend to agree with the motives we listed that clearly 
involved direct personal gain in the form of increased restaurant sales and increased personal 
reputations.  In an open response section in the questionnaire, some chefs provided additional 
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motivations for revealing recipes in a public forum, and most of these also had to do with 
enhancing private profits.  Chefs wrote that they were motivated to present their IP to the public 
at large because doing so would: Increase their personal reputation; generate publicity for their 
restaurant; inform potential patrons about what is offered in their restaurant; enable them to 
claim the “innovation space” before another chef got a related idea; be an enjoyable experience 
for them; increase likelihood they will receive information requests from chefs they appreciate; 
be an opportunity to promote regional products.   
 In summation, it appears to us that chefs’ behaviors regarding protecting and revealing 
recipe-related information  are consistent with efforts to increase their private benefit from their 
recipe innovations. 
 
Table 6 : Motivations for publicly revealing recipes  
 
Motivations : Mean (a) Std dev % of high agreement 
(b) 
Attract more customers in your restaurant 3.86 1.12 80% 
Increase your reputation 3.91 0.90 80% 
Increase the reputation of French gastronomy 3.58 0.96 64% 
(a) Scale 1 (totally wrong) to 5 (totally right)  
(b) High agreement means a choice of 4 or 5 on a scale from 1 to 5 
 
6. Discussion 
 We have now documented that accomplished French chefs both espouse and enforce IP-
related norms. Given these empirical findings, can we conclude that a norms-based IP system 
worthy of the name really exists among these French chefs?  We approach this question by 
listing the characteristics of the three major law-based IP systems.  We also list the analogous 
characteristics of a norms-based IP system for easy comparison (table 7).  
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Table 7: Comparison of law-based and norms-based IP Systems 
        Trade  Social Norms 
                          Patents         Copyright    Secrecy  Based IP 
 
Source of  Legislation Legislation Legislation Community  
Authority       social norms 
 
Subject   Inventions “Writings” Secrets  Information regarded 
Matter  as specified as specified having   as proprietary property 
Covered  in patent law in copyright business  by a given community 
    Law  value   
         
Nature of Right to   Right to  Right to   Right to use 
Control  control use control  prevent  and call for  
  of publicly production  use by those sanctions against 
  revealed  of copies who acquire violators of  
  invention  of work  secret   norm-granted 
      improperly property rights 
 
Ownership     Date of first  proof of  Proof that Community consensus 
Rights   filing or  authorship secret valuable that an individual 
established Date of    and protected  is the owner of 
by  Invention     specific information 
 
Conflict  Court   Court  Court  Community member(s) 
Resolution Decision Decision Decision agreement that norm- 
Method  (or out of  (or out of (or out of sanctioned property rights 
  court  court  court  of A have been violated by B 
  settlement) settlement) settlement)  
 
Av. Time and Several years Several years Several years Can be very rapid (days) 
Cost to  $2mm/case $440K/case  $1mm/case Cost low and distributed 
adjudicate paid by  paid by  paid by  across community. 
complaint litigants* litigants* litigants*      
 
Nature of  Validation of  Validation of  Validation of Validation of  
award to  IP claims; IP claims; IP claims; IP claims 
successful monetary monetary monetary 
complainant award  award  award 
 
Nature of civil law  civil law  civil law  Loss of status, 
violator’s penalty;  penalty,  penalty  shaming, denial 
punishment order to cease  order to cease   of future community 
  violation violation   benefits 
 
* Litigation costs for U.S. cases with from $1mm to 25mm at risk (middle range of cases reported) as reported by 
American Intellectual Property Association Law Practice Management Committee (2005) based upon a survey of 
their membership.  Bessen and Meurer 2008 report that the business costs of a patent suit – lost revenue, 
management time consumed, etc. – are much higher than the litigation costs documented by AIPLA. They estimate 
the total costs for a public firm being sued for patent infringement at $28.7 million in the mean and $2.9m in the 
median (Chapter 6, Table 2).  
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Clearly, norms-based IP systems have characteristics very different from law-based IP systems.  
However, both types do enable innovators to establish and enforce rights to some types of IP to 
their economic advantage.  So we do think it reasonable to dignify norms-based IP systems as 
“real” IP systems worthy of consideration along with their law-based counterparts.  
 With respect to some system characteristics listed in table 7, norms-based systems appear 
to have some major advantages relative to law-based IP systems.  Recall that social norms are 
developed by communities to deal with matters of importance to that community.  As can be 
seen from table 7, getting final resolution of a complaint via a law-based system on average costs 
millions of dollars and take years - at least in the United States. (AIPLA 2005, Bessen and 
Meurer 2008).  Indeed, given these high costs one is entitled to wonder what proportion of IP 
violations nominally covered by law-based systems are actually being adjudicated on the merits 
by those systems. Kesan and Ball (2006) find that only 5% of all cases filed are eventually 
adjudicated on the merits – the rest are settled before adjudication.  This low figure, the authors 
reason, is because it is often cheaper for both sides to settle than it is to complete a very 
expensive legal contest.  The associated loss to social welfare is that the validity of contested – 
and often very questionable - patent claims is seldom judicially established. 
 In contrast, a complaint can be brought in a social norms-based system by simply 
bringing the matter to the attention of influential members of the community.  If these members 
view the case as having merit, explanations may be requested of the apparent violator of the 
norm, and/or sanctions are applied very quickly.   
 As an example of rapid community norms enforcement among chefs, consider the recent 
community judgment that “Chef Robin” (Robin Wickens, owner and chef of the Interlude 
restaurant in Melbourne, Australia) had violated an anticopying norm.  The discussion took place 
on an on-line forum hosted on eGullet.com, a website for chefs and other serious “foodies.”  The 
entire episode, from the discovery of the violation to the close of case-specific discussion on the 
forum, took only 5 days.   
On March, 2006, Forum participant tb86  reported apparent recipe copying by “Chef Robin” 
(March 14, 2006, 04:02 PM).  “I am an Australian Chef in NY and was looking at the interlude 
[a Sydney restaurant] website and realized that a lot of the food has been copied identically from 
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some of the top chefs here.”  In his message, tb86 provided links to Interlude restaurant food 
photos, and also those of famous U.S. restaurants showing apparently identical presentations of 
identical recipes.  The Interlude chef, Chef Robin, quickly took down the incriminating photos 
from his restaurant website.  He then replied (March 15, 2006, 4:53PM): “Thought i should post 
my reply.  “My trip to America and staging [working as an intern] at Alinea [a famous Chicago 
restaurant] gave me ideas and i saw new techniques that after cooking for over ten years in some 
pretty good restaurants i had seen before. … Of course people are going to imitate it and evolve 
it.”   
 Many eGullet members quickly posted responses, with the great majority condemning 
Chef Robin’s behavior in strong terms.  Excerpts from three responses convey the flavor: “The 
"evolution" part might be where you are coming up short.” (Willie Lee, March 14, 06, 7:17PM);  
“Why don’t you also check out the menus at Cru and Guilt restaurants in NY for some more 
"evolutionary" ideas for your next menu….  Why were the links to the photos removed in the 
last 24 hrs?  New York is watching you” (Aussiechef76, Mar 14 2006, 09:31 PM);  
“Great....thanks to this my plans for ripping off Sandra Lee's Ranch Dressing and puke covered 
Frito Lay chips is never gonna come to fruition.” (peteswanson, March 15, 2006, 03:37 PM). 
Things continued in this vein for 5 days, at which point the site managers close the discussion. 
(eGullet forums 2006). 
 Reports of the controversy quickly spread to other news media, such as TheAge.com  
“Among Melbourne diners, the food at Robin Wickens' two-hatted Fitzroy restaurant, 
Interlude, has inspired such breathless adjectives as "whimsical", "daring" and "arch".  
But in recent days, a harsher term has been suggested: "plagiarised.”  The storm began 10 
days ago on specialist internet forum eGullet, after it was revealed that among Wickens' 
offerings was, in fact, a replica of a dish first "invented" at New York's famed WD-50…. 
Editorial staff from eGullet have since posted pictures of four other dishes by the 2005 
Age Good Food Guide young chef of the year [Robin Wickens], which emulate creations 
by Grant Achatz, of Chicago's Alinea, including a dessert served in a test tube. 
 “There is no question of legal action against Wickens: recipes, no matter how 
unique, cannot be protected by copyright, nor have they ever been successfully patented. 
But chefs and diners have questioned whether Wickens' conduct in replicating dishes — 
right down to the plating — is poor form. The question is pertinent in the world of top-
end modern restaurants, where creativity, not simply fine flavour and execution, is often 
demanded. 
 28  
 “Writing on the eGullet forum, Alinea co-owner Nick Kokonas said he agreed 
that there was no intellectual property case here. "In my mind, there is something greater 
— "intellectual integrity," he wrote.  Wickens has sent letters of apology to Achatz and 
WD-50's Wylie Dufresne for failing to give credit to them.” (Nguyen 2006). 
 
 Of course, norms-based IP systems also have major disadvantages relative to law-based 
systems.  Communities may punish “whistleblowers” along with violators; communities have no 
power to award monetary compensation to an injured party, and so on. Also, recall from our 
literature review that norms-based IP systems are only effective in controlling behaviors  “… 
when groups control stimuli that are valued (or disvalued) by the target person.” (Hackman 
1976, p. 1506).  In contrast, law-based systems have access to a type of sanction – confiscation 
of financial resources - that presumably would be of concern to all would-be violators within a 
particular laws’ zone of jurisdiction. This may mean that norms-based IP systems apply to a 
more limited scope of actors than do law-based systems. 
 As illustration, consider the case of high-fashion clothing design.  Just as is the case in 
recipes, law-based intellectual property systems do not protect clothing designs.  Cox and 
Jenkins (2005) note that, unconstrained by law-based IP, mass merchandisers are quick to 
“knock off” many novel clothing designs created by high fashion designers.  Mass 
merchandisers presumably do not consider themselves to be part of the high fashion designer 
community, and so would not be constrained by any IP-related social norms held by that group.  
(Of course, it is another question as to whether a more limited reach of community norms 
actually reduces innovators’ profits. In the case of fashion, Raustiala and Sprigman (2004) point 
out that rapid copying by mass market merchandisers may actually provide an economic benefit 
to high fashion designers.  When yesterday’s high fashion items become today’s mass market 
items, they say, high end buyers will no longer wear the versions they purchased – because they 
are no longer “exclusive.”  The likely consequence is an acceleration of the obsolescence cycle 
in high fashion clothing designs – to the benefit of high fashion designers.  Buyers within that 
market niche will return more often to purchase the newest, still exclusive items.)  
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 How widespread are norms-based IP systems? 
 Our present study is only an existence test for norms-based IP systems.  We next need to 
know whether norms-based IP systems are a niche phenomenon of curiosity value only, or 
whether they are a widely-applicable and economically important type of intellectual property 
system. A solid answer clearly must await further research. However, it is possible to speculate 
on the generality of the phenomenon via anecdotal evidence and also via existing scholarly 
understandings of the nature and enforceability of norms.   
 Anecdotally, there are interesting hints that norms-based IP systems are present in at least 
some fields today.  First, the eGullet.com online forum discussion we mentioned above suggests 
that IP-related norms exist among chefs beyond those specializing in French haute cuisine.  
Second, grounded research interviews we have conducted in the sports equipment field indicate 
that IP-related norms may also exist among founders and cofounders of small sports equipment 
firms. Thus, a cofounder of a snowboard firm explained in an interview with one of us how he is 
dealing with a competitor who has made an exact copy of one of his firm’s board designs.  “I 
have contacted him and said we consider this board to be an exact copy of our design.  I said that 
if he tried to advertise and sell this model we would put all our weight into destroying his image. 
A brand heavily depends on image when it comes to selling. On the Internet an image can be 
destroyed very quickly. This producer has created an Internet site in order to sell his production 
and the slightest rumor of copying or intellectual dishonesty would make consumers who use the 
Internet go away from him. It is our unique weapon … and we rely on it to protect us.”  
(According to our interviewee, the norm-violating snowboard producer in fact decided not to 
advertise the copied product after receiving this warning. Note the interesting twist on sanctions 
in this example: a producer is planning to rally potential customers of a rival producer – 
customers who apparently also have an anticopying norm – to punish that producer for a norms 
violation.)   
 Q: Do you mean that consumers would refuse to purchase a copy? A: “The general 
consumer always prefers price to quality, so if our competitor was selling a cheaper version of 
our product it would sell very well to the general consumer. But in our market: niche there are 
just a few producers, and our consumers are very aware of things. The risk of doing a bad move 
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is high. Another sanction available to us is to not cooperate with a badly behaved producer. Most 
firms [in our niche] do cooperate in various ways (make common orders to suppliers in order to 
get discounts on inputs; share technical information) and a copier tends to be excluded from this 
cooperation.” 
 Q: If you publicly say that you are copied by another producer, how would the big 
producers of the sector react? A: “The big brands would not care at all [about the norm violation] 
- but would instead maybe get interested, and begin to wonder whether something worth copying 
exists on this side of the market.” 
 From the viewpoint of theory, recall from our literature review that social norms 
generally are developed by groups only for behaviors which are viewed as important by most 
group members. Also recall that norms are enforceable when groups control stimuli that are 
valued (or disvalued) by a target group member.  The more an individual has a personal need for 
a social reward controlled by the group, the more he or she conforms.  Group members who do 
not much need or care about the social rewards that can be provided by their fellows (e.g., very 
high status members or very low status members not committed to remaining in the group) often 
conform less than other group members (Hackman 1976).  If we extend these same criteria to 
firms and economic incentives, we can speculate that conditions favorable to norm-based IP 
systems are: (1) the protection of IP is important to a “group” of firms; (2), group members 
consider any extant protection inadequate or unsatisfactory in some way; (3), group members 
control economic rewards and/or sanctions valued by group members; (4) actions by non-group 
members cannot destroy the value of sustaining the norm within the group, nor destroy the value 
of rewards and sanctions available to enforce the norm within the group.   
 The snowboard firm example presented above seems to fit these criteria: Product IP 
rights are apparently important to this group of “small, new firms,” and they find IP-related 
norms worth generating. Further, the group apparently can enforce sanctions within the group. 
Finally, since these firms collectively serve a niche market, violations of IP norms by “big 
brands” apparently will not destroy either the group’s market niche, nor the value of the 
sanctions and rewards the group has available to enforce adherence to its norms within its niche.  
As our case study findings show, these same conditions certainly hold for the group of 
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accomplished French Chefs we studied:  Recipe IP rights are important to members of this 
group, they find value in norms-based IP protections, and the group controls valuable rewards 
and sanctions that can be deployed to enforce IP-related norms.  Further, recipe copying by non-
group members such as McDonalds will probably not destroy the niche market for “the same” 
(but not really a substitute) product innovation served at a high-end French restaurant. 
 On the face of it, it seems likely that many fields additional fields will have the 
conditions just described. After all, many markets have niches served by few or many firms that 
may well view themselves as members of a group. (As the case of Chef Robin illustrates, group 
members need not be geographical neighbors in this Internet age). 
 
7. Suggestions for further research 
 If norms-based IP systems are indeed effective and common in today’s economies, there 
clearly is a great deal of research needed to better understand them.  In addition to research to 
determine the ubiquity and economic importance of norms-based IP systems, we think it would 
be very useful to understand the extent to which the norms that underlie such systems are 
similar.  A quick comparison between what earlier-cited researchers have told us about IP norms 
in scientific communities versus those we found in the community of accomplished French chefs 
suggests that further research will discover interesting differences as well as similarities.  One 
example of a likely difference: recall that the first norm we documented among accomplished 
chefs de cuisine was, ‘It is not honorable for chefs to exactly copy recipes developed by other 
chefs’.  It is likely that this norm will not be found among scientists.  After all, exact replication 
of experiments (with proper attribution) to check the accuracy of reported findings is a valued 
activity in science.  In contrast, the second and third social norms we identified among chefs do 
seem similar to information exchange norms reported among scientists (Bouty 2000, Kreiner and 
Schultz 1993, Merges 1996b).    
 As a second example of a likely difference in IP-related norms among fields, recall that 
the third important norm we encountered among our sample of chefs was ‘the right to be 
acknowledged as the author of a recipe one has created’. This norm was essential to chefs who 
wanted to profit from reputation-related gains by “freely revealing” their proprietary recipe 
 32  
information on, for example, a television program.  However, it is not obvious that this third 
norm will always be present in norms-based IP systems that include free revealing, because free 
revealing can produce private gains for one who reveals via mechanisms that are both dependent 
upon and independent of the recipients knowing the identity of the donor.  Gains that are 
dependent upon knowing the identity of the donor generally relate to reputational gains.  For 
example: ‘I am more likely to offer X a job because I know he is an innovator’ (Lerner and 
Tirole 2002).  Mechanisms for private gains by innovators who freely reveal that are not 
dependent upon knowing the identify of the donor include network effects. For example: ‘If I 
freely reveal how to build telephones, more telephones will be built and used.  The more 
telephones that are in use, the more benefit I gain from my telephone – because I can connect to 
more people’ (Harhoff et al. 2003, von Hippel 2005) 
 Norms that seem similar upon first inspection may in fact differ in important ways.  For 
example, anticopying norms clearly create monopoly power for innovating chefs. As was 
mentioned earlier, this power is similar to that endowed by a patent grant or a copyright: chefs 
may be technically able to copy some recipe innovations using only public information – but the 
anticopying norm prohibits them from doing it.  However, closer examination may show the 
monopoly powers granted by community anticopying norms to be more or less extensive or 
flexible than those granted by patent.  Thus, chefs apparently do not sell the rights to produce 
exact copies of their recipes to other chefs.  Yet, this is common practice among owners of 
patents in other fields.  Further investigation is needed to show whether this difference is a 
matter of what IP-related norms permit – or what chefs choose to do in exploiting their norms-
sanctioned rights. 
 It will also be useful to more deeply explore whether one system tends to dominate the 
other when both are present.  (For example, as was noted in our literature review, Ellickson 
(1991) found that extant laws  addressed how border fencing costs should be allocated between 
neighbors – but he also found that the affected people ignored these laws in favor of a system of 
norms of their own devising.)  Or, it may be that   norms and law-based IP systems can be 
complements. For example, as Sitkin (1995) points out in the context of corporate management, 
an increased reliance on formal rules and procedures rather than informal norms can sometimes 
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enhance trust on the part of system users, indicating that these two system types can be 
complements.   
 In summation, in the research reported upon here, we have demonstrated by example that 
norms-based IP systems exist in the present-day world.  We speculate that such systems may be 
quite common – but further research is required on this.  We propose that it will be useful to 
study norms-based IP systems further, and to learn how such systems can most usefully be 
applied to serve both innovators and society. 
 
 34  
References 
Journal Articles 
Allen, R. C. (1983). “Collective Invention.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 4(1): 1-24. 
 
Axlerod, Robert. (1986) An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, The American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 80, No. 4. pp. 1095-1111. 
 
Bendor, Jonathan and Piotr Swistak (2001), The Evolution of Norms.  American Journal of Sociology; 
Vol. 106 Issue 6, pp 1493 – 1545. 
 
Bernstein Lisa (1992) “Opting out of the legal system: extralegal contractual relations in the diamond 
industry” Journal of Legal Studies, 21, p. 115-157. 
 
Bouty, Isabelle (2000) Interpersonal and Interaction Influences on Informal Resource Exchanges 
Between R&D Researchers Across Organizational Boundaries, Academy of Management Journal, Vol 
43, No.1, pp 50-65. 
 
Dasgupta, P. and P. A. David (1994). “Toward a New Economics of Science.” Policy Research 23: 487-
521. 
 
Elster, Jon (1989) “Social Norms and Economic Theory”  The Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol 3 
No. 4 Autumn  pp. 99-117. 
 
Feldman, Daniel (1984) The Development and Enforcement of Group Norms, The Academy of 
Management Review, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 47-53. 
 
Gibbs, Jack (1965), Norms: The Problem of Definition and Classification, The American Journal of 
Sociology, Vol. 70, No. 5 pp. 586-594. 
 
Greif, Avner (1993) “Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade : the Maghribi 
traders’ coalition”, AER, vol.83, no. 3 (June) 
 
Hall, B. H. and D. Harhoff (2004). “Post Grant Review Systems at the U.S. Patent Office: Design 
Parameters and Expected Impact.” Berkeley Law Technology Journal 
 
Hansmann, Henry and Marina Santilli (1997) “Authors and Artists Moral Rights:  A Comparative Legal 
and Economic Analysis.” Journal of Legal Studies vol 26, (January) pp. 95-143. 
 
Harhoff, D., J. Henkel and E. von Hippel (2003). “Profiting from Voluntary Information Spillovers: How 
Users Benefit by Freely Revealing their Innovations.” Research Policy 32(10): 1753-1769. 
 
Johnson, C. B., Surlemont, P. Nicod, and F.Revaz (2005) "Behind the stars : a concise typology of 
Michelin restaurants in Europe," Cornell Quarterly, May. 
 
Kreiner, Kristian and Majken Schultz (1993) “Informal Collaboration in R&D.  The Formation of 
Networks Across Organizations.”  Organization Studies, 14/2, 189-209. 
 
 35  
Lerner, J. and J. Tirole (2002). “Some Simple Economics of Open Source.” Journal of Industrial 
Economics 50(2): 197-234.  
 
Macaulay S. (1963) “Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study”, American 
Sociological Review, Vol.28, No. 55. 
 
Merges, Robert (1996a) “Contracting into liability rules: Intellectual property rights and collective rights 
organizations” Californial Law Review 84 (October) p. 1293-1393 
 
Merges, R.(1996b) "Property Rights and the Commons: The Case of Scientific Research," Social 
Philosophy & Policy vol. 13, 145-53. 
 
Rai, Arti Kaur (1999) Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of 
Science Northwestern University Law Review Vol 94, No. 1 (Fall) pp. 77-152. 
 
Rimal, Rajiv and Kevin Real (2003) “Understanding the Influence of Perceived Norms on Behaviors” 
Communication Theory; 13:184-203 
 
Rosamond, Ben (2002), “Plagiarism, Academic Norms and the Governance of the Profession,” Politics, 
Vol 22, 3, (September), pp. 167-174(8) 
 
Schrader, Stephan (1991) " Informal technology transfer between firms: Cooperation through information 
trading"  Research Policy 20 :153-169. 
 
von Hippel, Eric (1987) "Cooperation Between Rivals: Informal Know-How Trading,"  Research Policy 
16: 291-302. 
 
Walsh, John P., Charlene Cho, and Wesley M. Cohen (2005) “View from the Bench: Patents and 
Materials Transfers,” Science vol 309 (23 September) pp. 2002-3. 
 
Books 
Axelrod, Robert (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation  New York: Basic Books 
 
Benkler, Yochai (2006) The Wealth of Networks Yale University Press, New Haven CT. 
 
Bessen, James and Michael J. Meurer (2008) Innovation at Risk: The Empirical Case that Today's Patent 
System Discourages Innovators -- and How to Fix It  Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 
forthcoming. 
 
Ellickson, Robert C. (1991).  Order without law: How neighbors settle disputes Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA 
 
Jaffe, Adam B. and Josh Lerner (2004) Innovation and Its Discontents: How our broken patent system is 
endangering innovation and progress and what to do about it Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
 
Merton, R. K. (1973). The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
 36  
Ostrom, Elinor (1990) Governing the Commons, Cambridge University Press 
 
Edited Books 
Hackman, J. Richard (1976), “Group Influences on Individuals”  Chapter 33 in M. Dunnette (ed.) 
Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Chicago, Rand MeNally, pp. 1455-1525. 
 
Sitkin, Sim B. (1995) “On the Positive Effect of the Legalization of Trust”  Research on Negotiation in 
Organizations, Vol 5,  pp 185-217 JAI Press, Inc. 
 
Research Reports, Magazine Interviews, etc. 
AIPLA Report of the Economic Survey 2005, (2005) Prepared under direction of the American 
Intellectual Property Association Law Practice Management Committee, Salvatore Anastasi, chair, and 
Kevin Alan Wolff, vice chair, (September). 
 
Buccafusco, Christopher J. (2007) On the Legal Consequences of Sauces:  Should Thomas Keller’s 
Recipes be Per Se Copyrightable?  Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal  Vol 24 No 3, pp. 1121-
1156. 
 
Cox, Christine and Jennifer Jenkins (2005) “Between the Seams, A Fertile Commons: An Overview of 
the Relationship Between Fashion and Intellectual Property”  Duke Law School Working Paper 
eGForums, The eGullet Society for Culinary Arts and Letters, 
http://forums.egullet.org/index.php?showtopic=84509&st=0&p=1149705&#entry1149705 
 
Gastronomy expert (anon) (2005), “Michelin 2005 : 3 étoiles pour Régis Marcon”, Nouvel Observateur. 
 
Kesan, Jay P. and Gwendolyn G. Ball (2006) “ How are Patent Cases Resolved?  An Empirical 
Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes.”  University of Illinois Working 
Paper, University of Illinois College of Law. 
 
Merges (2004) “From Medieval guilds to Open Source Software:  Informal Norms, Appropriability 
Institutions, and Innovation”  University of Wisconson Law School, Institute for Legal Studies 
Conference on the Legal History of Intellectual Property, Madison, WI (November 13) 
 
Nguyen, Kenneth (2006) “The Good Feud Guide” TheAge.com.au (March 26), 
www.theage.com.au/articles/2006/03/25/1143084055425.html#  
 
Raustiala, Kal and Christopher Sprigman (2004) “The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual 
Property in Fashion Design” University of California, Los Angeles, School of Law. Public Law and 
Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 06-04. 
 
Strandburg, Katherine (2006) "Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine" DePaul University 
College of Law Working Paper. 
 
Thiercelin, Thierry (2005) interview in Luxe Publishing www.luxePublishing.com. 
 
Zhou, Kevin Zheng and Laura Poppo (2005) “Relational Contracts in China: Relational Governance and 
Contract Assurance” Virginia Tech (September) 
